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AT-LARGE ELECTIONS AND VOTE
DILUTION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
A central premise of the American political system of repre-
sentative democracy is that each person's vote be meaningful
and efficacious. Indeed, in a truly "equal democracy," a "major-
ity of the electors would always have a majority of the represent-
atives; but a minority of the electors would always have a minor-
ity of the representatives." 1 If the vote of one individual is
accorded but a fraction of another's vote, or if an entire segment
of society is disenfranchised, as is arguably the case in many
municipal at-large electoral schemes, the government cannot be
deemed truly representative.
Although no single type of electoral system2 can be deemed
perfectly representative, the ideals of true representation and
voting equality are recognized as so important to the American
democratic system that the Supreme Court3 has found it imper-
ative for the judiciary to protect against vote dilution. 4 Vote di-
lution can be characterized as consisting of two types: interdis-
trict and intradistrict. Interdistrict vote dilution occurs when an
individual voter's electoral strength is either greater or lesser
than that of a voter in another district because the populations
1. J.S. MILL, Representative Government, in ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 105, 190 (R. McCallum ed. 1946) (1861).
2. Nearly all local governments in the United States utilize either at-large, district, or
mixed electoral systems to elect legislators. See infra note 8 and text accompanying
notes 66-68. Electoral systems based on proportional representation, while common in
Europe, are nearly nonexistent among American localities.
3. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court held a challenge to a reapportion-
ment scheme based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to be
justiciable. Prior to Baker, the Court had considered reapportionment to be a political
question. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
4. Vote dilution is the result of a set of "techniques for reducing or nullifying the
effects of the votes that minorities do cast." S. WASBY, VOTE DILUTION, MINORITY VOTING
RIGHTS, AND THE COURTS 1 (1982). The minorities whose votes can be diluted include
ethnic and racial groups, as well as geographically or economically distinct segments of a
larger constituency. See also Washington, Does the Constitution Guarantee Fair and
Effective Representation to All Interest Groups Making Up the Electorate, 17 How.
L.J. 91 (1971). Washington argues: "Fair and effective representation as a political sup-
position, therefore, is the ability of individual voters to be a component of an interest
group which has sufficient muscle to ... win the election." Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
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of the two districts are unequal in number.5 The Supreme Court
has controlled this type of vote dilution through application of
the "one person, one vote" principle,6 requiring the populations
of all legislative districts to be numerically equal to one another.
Intradistrict vote dilution,7 by contrast, occurs when an indi-
vidual's vote is effectively diluted within his or her own district.
This occurs when the votes of an identifiable racial, ethnic, po-
litical, or geographic group are assimilated into a larger elector-
ate, thereby diminishing that group's collective electoral
strength. For example, when several legislative districts are con-
solidated into one, and the several legislators representing the
consolidated district are elected on an at-large basis,' the en-
larged electoral base hampers the ability of a group of voters to
elect from among itself its proportionate share of representation.
Accordingly, a group of voters who previously constituted a ma-
jority in their smaller district becomes a minority in a larger dis-
trict, no longer able to elect its representative.
The Supreme Court has not established a basic constitutional
principle for remedying intradistrict vote dilution and has con-
sistently refused to declare local at-large election schemes un-
constitutional per se.9 As a result, the federal courts have vacil-
lated among various interpretations of the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments as to what standard of proof is required
to prove local at-large election schemes discriminatory. Concur-
rently with the Court's search for a way to assure all Americans
a right to an equally effective vote, Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act in 1965.10 In passing the Act, Congress, pursuant to
5. Consider, for example, a situation where voter A lives in a more populous legisla-
tive district than voter B. A has less voting strength than B because A's vote is a smaller
fraction of the total, thereby affording A less opportunity to cast a tie-breaking vote. See
generally R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIc REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLI-
Tics (1968).
6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567-68 (1964) (holding that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires state legislative seats to be apportioned
with districts of relatively equal populations); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377
U.S. 713, 736 (1964) ("An individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally
weighted vote cannot be denied .... ).
7. Some commentators have labeled intradistrict vote dilution as "group" vote dilu-
tion, due to the fact that the resultant dilution effectively shuts out identifiable groups
from representation. See generally R. DIXON, supra note 5.
8. Several variants of the multimember or at-large scheme exist. One is where all the
candidates for several legislative seats compete against each other. Another is where all
the voters cast their votes for a candidate in each of several subdistricts comprising the
at-large district.
9. See cases cited infra notes 13, 19 & 27.
10. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973
to 1973bb-1 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)).
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the enforcement clause of the fifteenth amendment, set out to
eliminate racial discrimination in voting. In 1982, Congress
amended section 2 of the Act, providing a standard to prove at-
large election schemes discriminatory upon a showing that the
system "results" in denying minority groups the opportunity to
elect their representatives to office.1
The 1982 amendments to the Act, however, have remained a
subject of controversy. Opponents of the Act misperceive munic-
ipal at-large electoral systems, believing they provide as much
minority representation as single-member district systems. This
Note addresses that misperception with data showing that at-
large schemes provide significantly less minority representation
than other schemes. The various standards used by federal
courts in reviewing the constitutionality of at-large election sys-
tems are outlined in Part I. Part II sets forth an analysis of Con-
gress's response to the judicial ambivalence toward at-large elec-
tions-the 1982 amendments to section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.1 2 Part III presents empirical data illustrating that, gener-
ally, blacks are significantly more underrepresented on city
councils in cities with at-large election systems than in cities
with district systems. Part IV discusses the implications of the
Note's empirical findings in light of the congressional amend-
ments to the Voting Rights Act. The Note concludes that the
congressional reimposition of the "results" standard for proving
at-large election systems discriminatory was a necessary step
forward because municipal at-large election systems remain sys-
tematically underrepresentative of significant population groups.
I. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO VOTE DILUTION CLAIMS OF AT-LARGE
ELECTIONS
Before the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, the
Supreme Court analyzed claims of vote dilution in at-large elec-
toral systems in terms of the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause. The first Supreme Court case addressing vote di-
ll. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982)).
The 1982 amendment to § 2 prohibits the application of any voting practice that "re-
suits in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color." Id. Prior to the 1982 amendments, the Act did not expressly.
set forth a standard for showing when a voting practice denied the right to vote in con-
travention of the Act. See infra Part II.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
Vote Dilution 1223
Journal of Law Reform
lution in an at-large election system was Fortson v. Dorsey. s At
issue was Georgia's state senate apportionment plan, which di-
vided fifty-four seats among fifty-four districts, drawn predomi-
nantly along county lines. To avoid mathematical disparity
among the districts, the plan provided that where more than one
district existed in a single county all the county's districts would
be conglomerated into a single district for voting purposes, and
the senators for each of the districts would be elected at-large by
a countywide vote. The plaintiffs claimed that the at-large, mul-
timember scheme unconstitutionally diluted their right to vote
because it could "[nullify] the unanimous choice of the voters of
a district, thereby thrusting upon them a senator for whom no
one in the district had voted.
14
Justice Brennan, however, writing for the majority, failed to
comprehend the plaintiff's intradistrict vote dilution claim. He
insisted on analyzing the problem strictly in terms of the "one
person, one vote" principle." So long as the population of a mul-
timember district was proportionately equal to the populations
of other districts, the Court reasoned, the election scheme
passed constitutional muster.16 Thus, extending the Court's
analysis to its logical conclusion, because mathematical disparity
can only arise when there are at least two districts to compare,
there can be no intradistrict vote dilution. The Court's reasoning
failed to recognize and distinguish a central difference of at-
large districting from single-member districting: while vote dilu-
tion in single-member districting schemes occurs between sev-
eral districts, vote dilution in at-large schemes occurs within the
single district.
17
Only Justice Douglas, the lone dissenter, correctly analyzed
the case in terms of intradistrict vote dilution. He concluded
that "to allow some candidates to be chosen by the electors in
13. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
14. Id. at 437.
15. Id. at 436. Justice Brennan quoted from dicta in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964), where the Court stated that "[olne body could be composed of single-member
districts while the other could have at least some multi-member districts." Id. at 577
(emphasis added by Brennan, J.).
16. Fortson, 379 U.S. at 437. The Court did leave open the possibility of finding an
at-large system in violation of the equal protection clause if it "designedly or otherwise"
operated to "cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population." Id. at 439.
17. Justice Harlan, in concurrence, noted that the majority's opinion suggested the
constitutionality of a state legislative reapportionment plan "must, in the last analysis,
always be judged in terms of simple arithmetic." Id. at 439-40.
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their districts and others to be defeated by the voters of foreign
districts" clearly constituted invidious discrimination. 8
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions 9 established that an at-
large election scheme could be subject to constitutional attack if
its "invidious effect" 0 minimizes the voting strength of racial or
political groups of voters.2 1 Elaborating on the "invidious effect"
standard in the only case where it invalidated a multimember
election scheme,22 the Court stated that racial and political
groups are not constitutionally entitled to proportionate repre-
sentation. Such groups are entitled only to an equal opportunity
to participate effectively in the election process. 8
Apparently unsatisfied with the Supreme Court's analysis of
the intradistrict vote dilution problem, the Fifth Circuit devel-
oped a more concrete test in Zimmer v. McKeithen.24 The Zim-
mer court enumerated a list of factors26 to aid in assessing the
18. Id. at 441-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Although Justice Douglas did not use the
term "intradistrict" vote dilution, he clearly had the concept in mind when analyzing the
multimember scheme at issue: "[E]ven if a candidate for one of those districts obtained
all of the votes in that district, he could still be defeated by the foreign vote, while he
would of course be elected if he were running in a district in the first group." Id. at 441.
19. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (reversing a district court's redistricting
of Indiana's legislature into all single-member districts); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S.
73 (1966) (reversing a district court's overturning of Hawaii's multimember legislative
districting).
20. See Burns, 384 U.S. at 88. The Burns Court listed examples of the invidious ef-
fect of discrimination caused by at-large election systems: "if ... districts are large in
relation to the total number of legislators, if districts are not appropriately sub-districted
to assure distribution of legislators that are resident over the entire district, or if districts
characterize both houses of a bicameral legislature rather than one." Id.
21. Theoretical and mathematical arguments alone are not sufficient to prove a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment; rather, "[t]he real-life impact of multi-member dis-
tricts on individual voting power" must be demonstrated. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124, 146 (1971).
22. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (upholding district court's findings and
conclusions that the black and Mexican-American communities were "effectively ex-
cluded from participation in the Democratic primary election process" because of a
Texas House of Representatives reapportionment plan establishing multimember
districts).
23. Mere evidence that a particular group lacks proportional representation, the
Court stated, is not enough to render the system unconstitutional. Id. at 765-66 (quoting
Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149-50):
[I]t is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not
had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiffs' burden
is to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in
question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the
district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice.
24. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), a/f'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
25. These factors have been subsequently referred to by other courts as the Zimmer
factors.
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constitutionality of a particular at-large scheme:26
1) the extent to which the election scheme is
rooted in racial discrimination;
2) accessibility of the candidate slating process to
minorities;
3) degree of legislative unresponsiveness to par-
ticularized needs of minorities;
4) tenuousness of the state policy underlying the
preference for at-large districting;
5) existence of past discrimination hampering ef-
fective minority participation in election
process;
6) use of unusually large districts, majority vote
requirements, anti-single-shot voting provi-
sions, or lack of provisions guaranteeing geo-
graphical representation within the district.
But the Supreme Court then rejected the "invidious effect"
standard and the Zimmer factor analysis approach in City of
Mobile v. Bolden.27 Basing its opinion on recent decisions hold-
ing that the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment require a showing of discriminatory in-
tent in order to prove a constitutional violation 2 the plurality
stated that proof of racially discriminatory intent was required
to overturn, as violative of the fourteenth amendment, an at-
large districting scheme. The Court also noted that because
showing a violation of the fifteenth amendment required proof
of a racially discriminatory motive as well, 2 to overturn at-large
26. The court in Zimmer noted that the presence of all the factors is not necessary to
establish an unconstitutional vote dilution. Rather, courts should evaluate the factors on
an aggregate basis. 485 F.2d at 1305.
27. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). For a more detailed discussion of the case law leading to
Bolden, see Parker, The 'Results' Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Aban-
doning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REv. 715 (1983).
28. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (requir-
ing proof of discriminatory intent to demonstrate that a zoning law violated equal pro-
tection of minorities); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring proof of in-
tent or purpose to sustain a due process claim that black plaintiffs were racially
discriminated against by a police department's written personnel test used in employee
recruitment).
29. In support of its assertion that the fifteenth amendment requires a showing of
discriminatory intent, the Court cited Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (find-
ing Oklahoma "grandfather" clause exempting from voting literacy requirement anyone
entitled to vote before 1866 unconstitutional because its purpose was to circumvent the
fifteenth amendment); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that the
drawing of municipal boundaries might be found unconstitutional because drafters were
1226 [VOL. 19:4
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districting systems would require a showing that the system was
established primarily for a discriminatory purpose.3 0 Moreover,
because the plurality deemed the Voting Rights Act to be coex-
tensive with the fifteenth amendment,"1 it concluded that the
Act supplied no additional authority from which to overturn an
at-large election system absent proof of discriminatory intent.
Prior to the Mobile decision, and in anticipation of the Su-
preme Court's application of an intent test for section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, several circuit court of appeals decisions3 2
held that meeting the Zimmer criteria raised an inference of dis-
criminatory purpose or intent. Although in Mobile the Supreme
Court left unclear whether or not it rejected this approach, 3 in a
subsequent case, 4 the Court held that the discriminatory intent
solely concerned with segregating black and white voters); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376
U.S. 52 (1964) (upholding state reapportionment scheme because there was no proof that
the legislature drew districts on racial lines or that the legislature was motivated by ra-
cial consideration); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (implicating Texas in conduct
of a racially exclusionary Texas Democratic Party primary election scheme); and Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that a state involved in purposeful exclusion of
blacks from participating in the election process violated the fifteenth amendment even
though the election was conducted by a private political organization neither authorized
nor regulated by the state).
30. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 65: The fifteenth amendment "prohibits only purposefully
discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote 'on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.'"
31. Id. at 60.
32. McIntosh County Branch of the NAACP v. City of Darien, 605 F.2d 753 (5th Cir.
1979); Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1979); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980).
33. The plurality in Mobile stated that the presence of Zimmer factors may afford
some evidence of a discriminatory purpose. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 73. Justice Stevens, con-
curring, rejected the plurality's "subjective intent" standard and stated that the proper
test for determining whether an electoral scheme was unconstitutional "should focus on
the objective effects of the political decision [that instituted the scheme]." Id. at 90.
For detailed discussions of the Mobile decision, see Parker, The Impact of City of
Mobile v. Bolden and Strategies and Legal Arguments for Voting Rights Cases in its
Wake, in THE RIGHT To VOTE 98 (Rockefeller Found. Conf. Rep. 1981); Comment, The
Standard of Proof in At-Large Vote Dilution Discrimination Cases After City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 103 (1981); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HAIv.
L. REv. 75, 149 (1980).
34. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618-22 (1982) (holding a district court's inference
of intentional discrimination from totality of factors not clearly erroneous requiring re-
versal; hence, multimember district was properly invalidated as violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment). Justices Powell and Rehnquist dis-
sented on the ground that discriminatory intent must be proven primarily by objective
evidence.
Cf. Note, The Constitutional Significance of the Discriminatory Effects of At-Large
Elections, 91 YALE L.J. 974 (1982) (perceptively observing that Rogers failed to state
what discriminatory effects of an at-large election system are necessary to raise the pre-
sumption of discriminatory purpose, and proposing that either racially polarized voting
patterns or lack of proportional representation should be sufficient to raise the
presumption).
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necessary to prove unconstitutional group vote dilution could be
inferred from the totality of factors and circumstances surround-
ing the particular at-large scheme. Moreover, because the Court
also noted that appellate courts should defer to this factually-
based inference, the post-Mobile constitutional standard for an-
alyzing at-large electoral systems became confusing, at best, or
virtually impossible to overcome, at worst.
II. SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
The legislative response to electoral systems that dilute mi-
nority voting power was the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Section 5
of the Act" gives the United States Attorney General authority
to review certain proposed changes to voting practices in specifi-
cally "covered" jurisdictions and "preclear" the changes before
they may be implemented." The Attorney General will not
preclear any voting or electoral practice that has the "effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color."1
7
In contrast to section 5's limited jurisdictional scope, section 2
provides a private cause of action for citizens to challenge a dis-
criminatory voting practice or procedure anywhere in the coun-
try." Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was intended to secure
the right of every citizen to participate fully in the electoral pro-
cess.3 9 Prior to the 1982 amendments, the language of section 2
did not clearly evince a particular standard for proving unconsti-
tutional group vote dilution," even though Congress provided
for a right of action for private citizens or the government to
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
36. Id.
37. Id. Section 5's "effects" standard prevents voting procedure changes that "would
lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise." Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). For
further discussion of the "effects" standard, see infra note 43.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
39. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, REPORT ON S. 1992, S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong.,
2d Seas. 4 [hereinafter cited as S. REP.], reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
177, 181.
40. Prior to the 1982 amendments, § 2 read: "No voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color .... Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-73, tit. II, § 206, 89 Stat. 400, 402 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
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challenge allegedly discriminatory voting practices or proce-
dures.41
In direct response to the Supreme Court's imposition of an
"intent" test for section 2 in Mobile v. Bolden,' Congress
amended the Act in 1982 to provide expressly for a more lenient
"results" test." Basically, the amendment codified the White
and Zimmer"" factor analysis approach as the standard of proof
for claims of intradistrict vote dilution in at-large election
schemes.45 Not only does the amended statute's "results" stan-
dard call for a consideration of the totality of circumstances sur-
rounding a particular election scheme, it also speaks in terms of
a right for minorities to have an equal opportunity to elect rep-
resentatives of their own choosing:
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is estab-
lished if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is
41. See id.
42. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). For a discussion of the Mobile case, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 27-31.
43. S. REP., supra note 39, at 15. In opposing enactment of the 1982 amendments to
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary expressed several legal concerns about the amendment's consti-
tutionality, including: (1) improper federal infringement on state authority; (2) over-
breadth of scope, because it applies to areas of the country where there is no history of
official discrimination; (3) "results" standard inappropriate means of enforcing the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments; and (4) violation of separation of powers between the
judiciary and the legislature. See id. at 169-73.
For a comprehensive analysis of the legal arguments in favor of the constitutionality of
the § 2 amendments, see McKenzie & Krauss, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: An
Analysis of the 1982 Amendment, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155 (1984). See also United
States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of amended § 2), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 375 (1984).
The "results" standard of § 2 is generally regarded as separate and distinct from § 5's
"effects" standard. The difference between the two standards is succinctly stated by Mc-
Kenzie & Krauss, supra, at 169: "Proof of liability under section 2 ... requires a review
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the challenged practice or procedure.
Unlike section 5, section 2 does not necessarily entail a comparison of the numerical
voting strength of minorities before and after a voting scheme is adopted." For further
discussion of the differences between the two standards, see Jones, Redistricting and the
Voting Rights Act: A Limited but Important Impact, 73 NAT'L Civic REV. 176 (1984).
44. See supra notes 22 (discussing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)) & 24-26
and accompanying text (discussing Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973)).
45. The amended § 2(a) now reads: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)
(1982).
The Senate Judiciary Committee stated its intention in amending the Act: "The 're-
sults' standard is meant to restore the pre-Mobile legal standard which governed cases
challenging election systems or practices as an illegal dilution of the minority vote. Spe-
cifically, subsection (b) embodies the test laid down by the Supreme Court in White."
S. REP., supra note 39, at 27 (footnote omitted).
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shown that the political processes leading to nomination
or election . . . are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a)
of this section in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice."
The amendment thus makes it clear that underrepresentation of
a minority group should be an important factor to consider in
determining the validity of an at-large system. 7
Several congressmen were concerned that the proposed
amendment's express "results" standard and reference to equal
opportunity to participate may be interpreted as requiring a sys-
tem of proportional representation.4 8 To ward off their concerns,
the sponsors of the bill agreed to include a proviso to the
amendment" disclaiming the idea that the amendment created
any right to proportionate representation."
In effect, Congress recognized the Court's unwillingness to use
the equal protection clause as a sword with which to strike down
at-large electoral systems that effectively prevent substantial mi-
nority groups from electing representatives. The 1982 amend-
ments to section 2 were designed to provide a method of
preventing at-large schemes that do, in fact, result in vote dilu-
tion for minority groups, and to eliminate any speculation as to
what standard of proof should be applied.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN AT-
LARGE ELECTIONS
Congressional opponents of the 1982 amendments to section 2
of the Voting Rights Act feared that the new language would
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982).
47. Id.
48. See S. REP., supra note 39, at 142-43.
49. The proviso, known as the "Dole Compromise," expressly disclaims any right to
proportional representation: "Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982).
50. Despite the proviso's disclaimer, Senator Hatch still expressed concern that a § 2
violation could be established under the results test merely with evidence of "the ab-
sence of proportional representation plus the existence of 'one or more objective factors
of discrimination', such as an at-large system of government." S. REP., supra note 39, at
97.
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mandate proportional representation,51 and that Congress was
usurping the Court's power to interpret the Constitution. 2 The
opponents also believed that Congress should not intervene to
protect minorities from the voting dilution caused by at-large
electoral schemes.58 After all, the opponents argued, because the
use of the at-large electoral system, with origins in reform efforts
to stop the abuses of political machines, " is so widespread, 55 any
resulting minority vote dilution is insignificant and does not jus-
tify using the more lenient "results" standard.5s
Congress debated, on an abstract, theoretical level, the seri-
ousness of the diluting effects that at-large electoral schemes
had on minority voting and representation.57 But whether or not
at-large election systems present structural barriers to minority
representation is best demonstrated by empirical analysis. An
empirical study on the effect that at-large election systems have
on minority representation, as compared to single-member and
mixed district systems,58 will show whether the 1982 amend-
ments to section 2 were or were not, in fact, justifiable.
A. Data Collection and Methodology
Rather than relying on any one technique for measuring mi-
nority representation on city councils, this Note utilizes several
social science techniques to determine the structural representa-
tiveness of municipal election systems. 9 This Note, incorporat-
ing more recent, 1980 Census figures into the statistical analysis,
51. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 43.
53. See SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RE-
PORT ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT [hereinafter cited as VOTING RIGHTS ACT REPORT], re-
printed in S. REP., supra note 39, at 139.
54. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
55. See table A in the appendix.
56. See VOTING RIGHTS ACT REPORT, supra note 53.
57. See S. REP., supra note 39.
58. For definitions of at-large, single-member district, and mixed electoral systems,
see infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
59. See Cole, Electing Blacks to Municipal Office: Structural and Social Determi-
nants, 10 URB. AFF. Q. 17 (1974); Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils: The
Impact of District Elections and Socioeconomic Factors, 12 URB. AFF. Q. 223 (1976);
MacManus, City Council Election Procedures and Minority Representation: Are They
Related?, 59 Soc. Sci. Q. 153 (1978); Robinson & Dye, Reformism and Black Representa-
tion on City Councils, 59 Soc. Sci. Q. 133 (1978); see also Jones, The Impact of Local
Election Systems on Black Political Representation, 11 URB. AFF. Q. 345 (1976); Taebel,
Minority Representation on City Councils: The Impact of Structure on Blacks and His-
panics, 59 Soc. Scl. Q. 142 (1978). Cf. Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do
They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966).
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updates the findings of other studies." Recent data on black
council representation in cities were derived from the National
Roster of Black Elected Officials, 1982.61 Population and socio-
economic data were drawn from the U.S. Census of Population,
1980.62 Information on individual city election type was derived
from the 1982 edition of The Municipal Year Bookaa and The
Encyclopedia of American Cities.1
4
The sample tested comprised 268 municipalities with popula-
tions of 25,000 or more and a black population of at least ten
percent. 5 The electoral systems used in all the cities were char-
acterized as either at-large, district, or mixed.66 An at-large sys-
tem is one where each citizen votes from among all the council
candidates running in the city for as many as there are council
seats up for election that year.6 7 A district system allows the
voter to cast only one vote for a council candidate residing in the
voter's district. A mixed system, as its name suggests, employs a
combination of at-large and district voting.
B. Findings
Many cities throughout the country now employ at-large sys-
tems.68 Nearly 60% of all U.S. cities with populations over
25,000 utilize an at-large system for electing council members,
while 12.4% use a pure district system. 9 Western cities employ
at-large schemes most often (81.3%), while midwestern cities
utilize at-large systems least frequently (50.3% ).70 Cities with
higher percentages of black populations use at-large election sys-
tems as frequently as cities with smaller black populations1
60. The studies cited supra note 59 used data from the 1960 or 1970 Census.
61. JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, NATIONAL ROSTER OF BLACK ELECTED OFFI-
CIALs, 1982.
62. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION,
1980.
63. INTERNATIONAL CITY MGMT. ASS'N, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK, 1982.
64. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CITIES (0. Nergal ed. 1980).
65. This sample of 268 cities includes all those cities for which adequate data were
available from the above sources. Some cities that met the sample criteria were neverthe-
less excluded from the sample because data for those cities were not available.
66. This categorization follows that employed in the studies cited supra note 59.
67. For further discussion of the most widely utilized at-large election schemes, see
supra note 8.
68. See table A in the appendix.
69. Id.
70. See table B in the appendix.
71. Cities whose black populations comprised between 10% and 25% of the total
population were as likely to have at-large electoral systems as cities whose black popula-
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1. Comparing proportionate measures of black representa-
tion for at-large, district, and mixed cities- Similar to some of
the other empirical studies,72 a standardized variable is used to
measure the proportion of black representation on city councils
to that of white representation. This variable, the Black Council
Penetration (BCP), is the ratio of a city's percentage of black
city council members to the percentage of the city's black popu-
lation. A ratio of 1.00 for a particular city, for instance, would
indicate that the black share of the city's council would be ex-
actly equal to the black share of the city's population. Ratios
exceeding 1.00 indicate overrepresentation of blacks on the
council, while ratios below 1.00 indicate underrepresentation."
Thus, a BCP ratio of 0.50 indicates that the percentage of blacks
on the city's council is half the percentage of blacks in the city's
population.
The average BCP for all cities with populations over 25,000
and at least a 10% black population, regardless of election type,
is 0.504. 74 On the average, then, blacks receive only about one-
half the representation on city councils that their population
percentages would have predicted as proportional.
As compared to the BCP found for district systems, the BCP
for at-large systems is significantly lower.75 Cities with at-large
systems have an average BCP of only 0.399. In contrast, the
BCP for district cities is 0.771. Eliminating cities in which the
black population exceeds 50% of the population, the average
BCP for at-large cities is only 0.385, compared with a much
more proportional BCP of 0.764 for district cities.7 The BCP
averages for mixed cities, as expected, fall between at-large and
district cities.
77
The effect of election type on black representation in city
councils is most dramatically illustrated in those cities where
blacks constitute 31-40% of the population.78 The BCP for cities
in this population range is higher for district cities but lower for
at-large cities than in any other category. In district cities of this
type the BCP is 0.830, over two times as great as the corre-
sponding 0.362 BCP for at-large cities.
tions constituted a greater percentage of the population. See table D in the appendix.
72. See studies cited supra note 59.
73. Essentially, a BCP ratio of 1.00 would mean perfect proportional representation
for blacks.
74. See table C in the appendix.
75. Id.
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Isolating cities by region reveals some interesting findings.
Contrary to widely-held beliefs, 79 the underrepresentation of
blacks is not a problem confined only to the South, but exists in
nearly equal proportion throughout all regions of the country. 0
At-large cities of the West prove most inequitable for black rep-
resentation, holding an average BCP of only 0.237.81 In compari-
son, the average BCP for southern at-large cities is 0.391, while
for midwestern at-large cities it is 0.402, and for northeastern at-
large cities it is 0.561. Southern district cities, however, are the
most underrepresentative district cities in the country.
Most significantly, the analysis shows that district cities in
every region have significantly higher BCP ratios than counter-
part at-large cities.82 The disparity between BCP ratios of at-
large and district cities is most pronounced in the West.83
2. Illustrating the underrepresentation of blacks in at-large
systems by regression analysis- Relying merely on BCP ratios,
however, can be somewhat misleading. The BCP ratio average,
while a useful tool to give a general perspective on minority rep-
resentation, is somewhat artificially skewed lower because it au-
tomatically scores every city without a black person on its coun-
cil at zero, regardless of whether that city's population is 25,000
or one million.8 Accordingly, the overall BCP average for a
group of cities can reflect a much lower value than would result
from totalling the number of black council members and black
populations for the entire group of cities prior to calculating the
BCP ratio.
Regression-based analysis can correct this deficiency and pro-
vide a clearer indication of the effect of city electoral schemes on
the ability of blacks to get elected to office. 85 Regression analysis
takes into account the fact that cities without black council
members have different black population percentages. 86 More-
over, a regression-based analysis makes it possible to examine
the electoral system as a variable across a range of black popula-
79. Including the contentions of the opponents of the 1982 amendments to § 2 in
Congress. See S. REP., supra note 39.
80. See table E in the appendix.
81. See table F in the appendix.
82. Id.
83. In the West, at-large cities average a BCP of only 0.237 while district cities aver-
age a BCP of 0.927. Id.
84. See Engstrom & McDonald, The Election of Blacks to City Councils: Clarifying
the Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the Seats/Population Relationship, 75 AM.




tion percentages.8 7 Thus, in contrast with the BCP ratio meth-
odology, cities of differing black populations are not accorded
the same weight for determining the minority representativeness
of a particular electoral system. Rather, the differences in black
population percentages are taken into account in deriving the
resultant index of representativeness.
In this regression analysis, each city's black population per-
centage is directly compared to its black council percentage. The
data are then fit into a set of linear relationships, described by
an equation. 8 The slope of the equation reveals how proportion-
ately representative the particular election system is in general.
Thus, true proportional representation, where the percentage of
a city's black population is equal to its percentage of black coun-
cil members, yields a slope of 1.00. The smaller the slope value,
the less proportionally representative is the system.
The analysis of cities in the three electoral systems reveals
once again that district cities provide the most proportional rep-
resentation for blacks (slope = 0.900), at-large cities provide the
least (slope = 0.589), and mixed cities are in between (slope -
0.844). 89 A graph of the equations more vividly illustrates the
disparity of representativeness between district, at-large, and
mixed electoral systems revealed by regression analysis.90 The
graph shows that district systems are much closer to the line of
perfect proportional representation than either at-large or mixed
systems, with at-large systems being the least representative.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
An analysis of the empirical data based on the 1980 Census
corroborates the findings of several other political science analy-
ses of at-large election systems:91 namely, that at-large systems
87. "A regression-based analysis also permits one to examine the impact of electoral
arrangements in the conceptually most appropriate way, as a specifying variable which
establishes conditions under which the seats/population relationship varies, rather than
as an independent variable with a direct impact." Id. (emphasis in original).
88. Using a model similar to the one espoused by Engstrom & McDonald, supra note
84, at 347, the equation is in the following form:
BCC% = [y-intercept] + xBP%
where BCC% is the percentage of blacks on the council and BP% is the percentage of
blacks in the population. The x is the slope of the equation and the y-intercept describes
the linear equation's intersection point with the vertical axis.
89. See graph 1 and accompanying explanations in the appendix.
90. Id.
91. See supra note 59.
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reflect more underrepresentation for minority groups than do
mixed or district systems. Yet, even so, the congressional action
in amending the Voting Rights Act would not be justified unless
it can also be shown that at-large election schemes are the cause
of the underrepresentation, i.e., at-large election systems are
structurally and inherently less representative.
Undoubtedly, factors apart from the electoral structure of a
city affect the ability and desire of minority groups to elect
members of their group to office. For example, education level,
income level, partisan activity, and occupational characteristics
may play some role. Nevertheless, each of these socioeconomic
factors can be controlled to permit a measurement of the impact
of electoral schemes on the ability of minority groups to achieve
representation on city legislatures. One recent study,9 control-
ling for socioeconomic characteristics, found the relationship be-
tween electoral structure and black representation unaffected.' 3
Given that, in and of themselves, at-large electoral systems im-
pede electoral opportunities for minorities, the 1982 congres-
sional amendment to section 2, codifying the "results" test as
the standard for showing a violation of the Voting Rights Act,
was timely and justified for several reasons.
First, the "results" standard is an appropriate means of en-
forcing the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments' guarantees of
due process and equal protection. The burden of proving dis-
criminatory intent, which the Supreme Court attempted to im-
pose, is practically insurmountable unless evidence showing dis-
criminatory effect can raise a presumption of discriminatory
purpose. "' Many at-large electoral systems were adopted during
the municipal reform movement in the early part of the 20th
92. Engstrom & McDonald, supra note 84.
93. The Engstrom and McDonald study, id., controlled for population size, rate of
population change from 1960 to 1970, median family income, median school years com-
pleted by those over 25 years old, and the percentage of the white-collar labor force.
These factors were added to the regression equation and tested for both uniform impact
across all electoral systems and conditional impact in each system. The slopes for the
representativeness of blacks for each of the three electoral systems remained virtually
unaffected, and the regression coefficients for the socioeconomic factors suggested very
slight impact.
The Engstrom and McDonald study refuted the findings of Cole, supra note 59, and
MacManus, supra note 59, which concluded that electoral structures have only minimal
impact when size, growth rate, income, education, and occupation characteristics are
considered. Perhaps the reason for the divergent findings, Engstrom and McDonald
point out, is that the other studies used a subtractive measure of proportionality, which
understates the level of underrepresentation in cities with smaller black populations.
Engstrom & McDonald, supra note 84, at 350-51.
94. But see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982).
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century to prevent the establishment of or to destroy existing
political machines. Undoubtedly, some of the appeal of the re-
formist proposal of at-large electoral schemes stemmed from
prejudice and racism, but many cities had genuine problems of
political corruption and viewed at-large elections as a possible
solution.95 Thus, proving exactly why a particular municipality
adopted an at-large electoral scheme is not only difficult, such
an inquiry is blind to the present diluting effects that the system
imposes on minorities.
Secondly, the data suggest that there is no evidence of a sub-
stantial movement toward at-large systems. Once a city reaches
a certain minority population, 6 dilution of minority voting
strength is not an apparent, widespread purpose. This does not
mean, however, that Congress should be prohibited from dealing
effectively with the rampant problem of minority voting dilution
currently existing in at-large electoral systems. Although section
5 of the Voting Rights Act puts a check on intentional switching
over to at-large systems having a discriminatory effect,9 7 at-large
electoral schemes are so widespread already that denying the
federal government the power to provide for a reasonable means
of challenging election schemes that blatantly dilute minority
voting power would allow a significant amount of official dis-
crimination to flourish in the nation's cities.
Finally, the findings of this study as to the underrepresenta-
tiveness of at-large electoral systems can be analogously applied
to other "minority" groups, such as geographic or economic mi-
nority groups, although the Voting Rights Act does not protect
them. For instance, an older section of a city with distinct con-
cerns, such as infrastructure renovation, housing, or urban re-
newal, may be entirely ignored by a city council elected at-large
because no councilperson resides in that part of the city and the
citizens of that section cannot, as a group, garner enough votes
to elect someone from their own community. Cities contem-
plating implementing or changing their existing system of coun-
cil election should consider the fact that at-large systems, gener-
95. See generally H. ALDERFER, AMERICAN LocAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
298-309 (1956); D. LOCKARD, THE POLITICS OF STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT 337-40 (1st
ed. 1963).
96. See table C in the appendix.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). Section 5 requires certain state and local voting proce-
dure changes to be "precleared" by the Attorney General. The section is limited to states
that used certain testing devices to qualify voters after 1964. See supra note 43 (discuss-
ing the differences between the "effects" and "results" standards of proving voting dilu-
tion under the Voting Rights Act).
98. S. REP., supra note 39.
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ally, are not as representative of the different segments of the
citizenry as district or mixed systems.
CONCLUSION
Black representation levels on city councils with at-large sys-
tems are strikingly low for cities of all sizes. The evidence illus-
trates that at the local level, at-large electoral systems do not
result in representation of blacks to the same degree as whites.
Analogously, it is probable that other groups holding some kind
of minority status in an at-large city face the same sorts of
structural problems in obtaining the representation of their
choice. Thus, the most practical and reasonably effective way of
ensuring minority groups an equal opportunity to elect local leg-
islators of their choice, short of declaring at-large systems un-
constitutional per se or mandating proportional representation,
is to prohibit any system that "results" in vote dilution, as pro-
vided in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.99
Ample evidence exists showing that at-large electoral systems
dilute minority votes throughout the entire nation, not just in
southern cities. Actually, voting dilution is even more acute in
other parts of the country. Thus, section 2 appropriately applies
to the whole nation and should not be limited to areas where a
history of discrimination exists.
In amending section 2 to provide for a "results" test, Congress
helped provide minorities with a more equal opportunity to elect
representation to local government by subjecting to judicial
scrutiny at-large electoral schemes that, in fact, result in vote
dilution. In a political culture that generally disfavors propor-
tional representation electoral schemes, the "results" standard
of section 2 is perhaps the best alternative.
-Richard A. Walawender





Distribution by Population of U.S. Cities with Over 25,000 People Electing
Councils Under At-large, District, and Mixed Electoral Schemes
Percent of Total Number of Cities**
Population Total Number of
Cities Reporting At-large District Mixed
Over 25,000 (824) 59.8 (493) 12.4 (102) 27.8 (229)
25,000-49,999 (463) 63.5 (294) 13.2 (61) 23.3 (108)
50,000-99,999 (226) 59.3 (134) 8.8 (20) 31.9 (72)
100,000-249,999 (95) 50.5 (48) 15.8 (15) 33.7 (32)
Over 250,000 (40) 42.5 (17) 15.0 (6) 42.5 (17)
*Source: INTERNATIONAL CITY MGMT. Ass'N, MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK, 1982.
**Numbers in parentheses are the number of cities constituting category.
TABLE B*
Distribution by Region of Country of U.S. Cities Electing Councils Under
At-large, District, and Mixed Electoral Schemes
Percent of Total Number of Cities
Geographic Total Number of
Location** Cities Reporting*** At-large District Mixed
Northeast (810) 68.5 (555) 16.2 (131) 15.3 (124)
Midwest (1324) 50.3 (666) 21.5 (284) 28.2 (374)
South (1249) 74.2 (927) 9.4 (117) 16.4 (205)
West (706) 81.3 (574) 8.9 (63) 9.9 (70)
*Source: INTERNATIONAL CITY MGMT. Ass'N, MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK, 1982. In-
cludes all cities with over a 2500 population.
**In accordance with U.S. Census delineation of regions.
***Numbers in parentheses are the number of cities comprising category.
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TABLE C
Mean BCP* of Cities** by Type of Electoral System
Total At-large District Mixed
Number: 268 144 43 81
Mean BCP: .504 .399 .771 .549
*BCP = Black Percentage of City Council
Black Percentage of City Population
**Cities with population of at least 25,000 and at least 10% black population.
TABLE D
Mean BCP* of Cities** by Percent of Black Population
Percent of
Black Pop. Total At-large District Mixed
1-100% .504 (268) .399 (144) .771 (43) .549 (81)
10-20% .490 (110) .368 (60) .778 (16) .531 (34)
21-30% .485 (62) .405 (34) .733 (9) .511 (19)
31-40% .462 (46) .362 (29) .830 (8) .457 (9)
41-50% .579 (25) .492 (9) .685 (6) .595 (10)
0-50% .487 (243) .385 (132) .764 (39) .525 (72)
51-100% .670 (25) .561 (12) .845 (4) .737 (9)
Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to number of cities in category.
Black Percentage of City Council
*BCP =
Black Percentage of City Population
**Cities with population of at least 25,000.
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TABLE E
Mean BCP* of Cities** by Region of Country
Total South West Midwest Northeast
Number: 268 133 25 65 45
Mean BCP: .504 .472 .470 .540 .569
Black Percentage of City Council
*BCP -
Black Percentage of City Population
**Cities with population of at least 25,000 and at least 10% black population.
TABLE F
Mean BCP* of Cities*
by Region of Country and Type of Electoral System
Total South West Midwest Northeast
Total: .504 (268) .472 (133) .470 (25) .540 (65) .569 (45)
At-large: .399 (144) .391 (82) .237 (14) .402 (30) .561 (18)
District: .771 (43) .689 (19) .927 (7) .807 (10) .787 (7)
Mixed: .549 (81) .549 (32) .485 (4) .599 (25) .499 (20)
Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to number of cities in category.
Black Percentage of City Council
*BCP-
Black Percentage of City Population
**Cities with population of at least 25,000 and at least 10% black population.
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GRAPH 1
Relationship Between Percentage of Black Population and Percentage of







10 20 30 40 50
Percentage of Black Population (BP%)
At-large cities:
At-large BC% - -3.945 + 0.589 BP%
standard error of slope = 0.068
r$ 0.342
District cities:
District BC% - -3.002 + 0.900 BP%
standard error of slope = 0.099
r - 0.665
Mixed cities:
Mixed BC% - -6.619 + 0.844 BP%
standard error of slope = 0.085
r* = 0.555
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